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Generation X-Phi 
Following the publication of Words and Things, Ernest Gellner’s 1959 polemic against 
what Bertrand Rusell described in his laudatory preface as ‘the linguistic philosophy 
now in vogue at Oxford’, the cluster of philosophers under attack placed a stronger 
emphasis on the multiplicity of their diverse aims, methods, and viewpoints (cf. Mehat 
1963, part I). Those leading the relatively new movement in experimental philosophy 
have the good sense to highlight the diversity of their ambitions from the outset: 
 
Although the movement has a name, it includes a variety of projects 
driven by different interests, assumptions, and goals... While some 
experimental philosophers use data about ordinary intuitions to support 
philosophical theories, others use such data to better understand the 
psychological mechanisms that generate such intuitions, while still 
others gather such data to show that some intuitions may be too 
unreliable to support philosophical theories in the first place 
(Nadelhoffer and Nahmias: 123; cf. Knobe & Nicholls: Ch. 1). 
 
This essay is concerned only with that branch of experimental philosophy (X-Phi) that 
deals with intuitions relating to everyday language and the concepts it embodies. The 
‘experiments’ in question essentially involve Gallup polls focusing on subjects’ 
intuitions as these surface in response to various vignettes, most famously that of a 
CEO who decides to implement a financially rewarding new program, knowing that it 
will have certain (harmful or helpful) effects on the environment (cf. Knobe 2003). I 
shall dub this view ‘Experimental Linguistic Philosophy’ (ELP) because it is primarily 
an investigation into what people will ordinarily say when asked certain questions 
(though for the most part these are not explicitly linguistic or conceptual). I will have 
nothing to say about other strands of X-Phi.  
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Prima facie, ELP has much in common with ‘that now distant philosophical style’1 of 
its cousin, ‘Ordinary Language’ or ‘Oxford Linguistic’ Philosophy (OLP), neither of 
which singles out a uniquely identifiable doctrine or school in the way that ELP might 
plausibly be thought to.2 Both ELP and OLP focus on everyday concepts and take 
ordinary usage to be philosophically relevant. While neither movement has an agreed 
manifesto on these things, they are both sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘one 
cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its application and learn from 
that’.3
  
 
Their general goals and methods, however, seem to differ radically. ELP collects 
statistical data in the hope of offering psychological explanations of people’s intuitions, 
whilst OLP focuses on linguistic and conceptual norms, often with the aim of 
dissolving disputes that arise through their abuse.  
 
What follows is an exploration of ELP’s uneasy relation to OLP. I shall argue that they 
share deep convictions that go against the grain of conventional conceptual analysis, 
which I distinguish from OLP. I shall conclude that while ELP can tell us much that is 
of great interest about human nature (by testing our intuitions and beliefs) it is in no 
position of privilege to determine correct linguistic usage. It may help philosophy in 
numerous ways, but improving upon OLP in this respect is not one of then.  
 
Analysis and Clarification 
Alan Turing opened his landmark article ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ by 
remarking that the question ‘Can machines think?’ should begin with definitions of the 
meaning of the terms ‘machine’ and ‘think’. To this he adds the following qualification: 
 
The definitions might be framed so as to reflect as far as possible the 
normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of 
the words “machine” and “think” are to be found by examining how they 
are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
meaning and the answer to the question “Can machines think?” is to be 
sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. 
Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by 
another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively 
unambiguous words. 
 
Writing in 1950, Turing is here attempting to distance himself from a methodologies 
which focus on the ordinary usage of terms. He proposes to replace these with an  
‘imitation game’ (now called the ‘Turing Test’) in which an interrogator attempts to 
determine which of two ‘subjects’ is human and which is a machine, the latter being 
defined technically as a ‘digital computer’.4 Turing’s mischaracterisation of the general 
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OLP approach was typical for its time.5 Roderick Chisholm, for example, makes much 
the same mistake in the following passage (contemporary with Turing’s), attempting a 
reductio of paradigm case arguments:6
 
 
Let us begin by asking how we would show that a philosopher is using 
language incorrectly. Suppose we have found an epistemologist who 
holds that certainty is very difficult to attain: he tells us that although 
people may believe that there is furniture in the room or that the earth 
has existed for hundreds [sic] of years past, no one can be certain that 
such beliefs are true. We might point out to him that people do call such 
beliefs “certain”; we might go on to note that ordinarily, one would 
apply the word “uncertain” only to beliefs of a much more problematic 
sort, for instance to conjectures about the weather; we might add that, if 
anyone were to teach a child the meaning of the words “certain” and 
“uncertain,” he would never cite as an uncertain belief the one about the 
furniture; and so on. This sort of technique, which is frequently used, 
would show that the epistemologist disagrees with most people about the 
denotation of the word “certain,” since he does not apply that word to 
the beliefs to which it is ordinarily applied. But would it show that he is 
using the word incorrectly? To see that it would not, let us consider a 
different case. A fifteenth century geographer might have pointed out to 
Columbus that ordinarily people apply the word “flat” and not the word 
“round” to the earth...(Chisholm 1951: 175-6). 
 
The mistake is to identify claims about how ‘one’ (or ‘we’) would ordinarily apply a 
word with beliefs or intuitions about correct linguistic usage.  OLP claims about 
ordinary usage were never claims about either personal or majority beliefs - fallible or 
otherwise - but about objective norms. Turing and Chisholm’s conflation is of interest 
here because the type of linguistic investigation they attack adheres to at least one view 
that ELP has both of itself and of what it calls ‘conceptual analysis’, which its 
proponents sometimes mistakenly takes to include OLP. Thus, for example, Joshua 
Knobe and Shaun Nichols write: 
 
...the conceptual analyst might write “in this case, one would surely 
say...,” while the experimental philosopher would write, “in this case, 
79% of subjects said...”’ and back her claims with statistical data (Knobe 
& Nichols 2008: 4). 
 
The aim of conceptual analysis, as practiced by, among others, philosophers as diverse 
as Russell, Moore, Ayer, and early Wittgenstein was to report discoveries about the 
(logical structure of) the world. The optimistic thought that this could be achieved was 
a corollary of the view that our concepts were the mirror of reality, to steal a phrase 
from Richard Rorty. This had little to do with ‘what one would surely say’, indeed 
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Russell (as we saw from the outset) would firmly support Gellner’s critique of the 
practice of appealing to common and/or correct linguistic usage in order to ‘solve’ 
philosophical problems. He was motivated, instead, by the idea that complex 
propositions or concepts could - like chemical compounds - be informatively broken 
down into more basic (logical or conceptual) elements or atoms:7
 
 
Every proposition which we can understand must composed wholly of 
constituents with which we are acquainted (Russell 1912:21). 
 
I call my doctrine logical atomism...because the atoms that I wish to 
arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not 
physical atoms. Some of the will be what I call ‘particulars’ – such 
things as little patches of colour or sounds, momentary things – and 
some of them will be predicates and relations and so on. The point is that 
the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom 
of physical analysis (Russell 1956: 179). 
 
Perhaps the most popular target of analysis has been the concept of knowledge. Ayer, 
for example, concluded that ‘the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that 
something is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one 
be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure’ (1956: 35). A similar 
view was held by Chisholm (1957:16) who, as we have just seen, was hardly a friend of 
OLP. Russell was less optimistic of the possibility of a precise definition, finding 
everyday (non-technical) terms too ‘vague’ to do the job (1912:78), though he did 
conclude that ‘what we firmly believe, if it is true, is called knowledge, provided it is 
either intuitive or inferred (logically or psychologically) from intuitive knowledge from 
which it follows logically’ (1912:81). By contrast OLP apologist Oswald Hanfling 
(2003) argued against the possibility of such a reductive analysis, not in virtue of 
finding ordinary language defective but because he took the word ‘knowledge’ to be no 
different from any other in having a multitude of interrelated senses that cannot be 
captured in terms of any one or more common features (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: § 67). It 
is ironic that many philosophers who came to be associated with OLP gave their books 
titles such as The Concept of Mind (Ryle) and The Concept of Law (Hart), when in 
effect their books showed that there was no one single concept of such things but 
numerous interrelating conceptions, a point often lost to advocates of conceptual 
analysis, as opposed to those of ELP.  
 
OLP, then, is generally not interested in analysing concept in the traditional sense of 
breaking them down into smaller conceptual components; instead it often seeks to 
clarify or elucidate by laying out the detailed norms of their employment. The sound of 
the two methodologies clashing has been aptly recorded by Frank B. Ebersole: 
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Like many another I was once committed to a certain type of 
philosophical endeavor—a type that goes under the names of "linguistic 
analysis" or "conceptual analysis" . . . Then I read Wittgenstein. My first 
reaction was to add footnotes to the things I had been writing. Then I 
added appendices. Finally I tore the things up; and I have been trying in 
various ways ever since to overcome a state of paralysis (1972: 186). 
 
Supporters of ELP have been known to ignore the important methodological difference 
between traditional analysis (of the sort practised by Russell, who was ‘persuaded that 
common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy’8
 
) and post-Wittgensteinian 
concern with conceptual clarification.  Kwame Anthony Appiah, for instance, reports 
the following anecdote: 
In the empirical spirit, I should report that, when I typed the phrase “it 
would be natural to say” into Google’s Book Search, it happily returned, 
as its top search results, passages by Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson, Max 
Black, and Bertrand Russell (2008b:VI).9
 
 
Like OLP, ELP is also interested in clarification as opposed to analysis but what it 
seeks to clarify does not appear to be conceptual norms but, rather, particular 
conceptual uses and the reasons that motivate  them. In this respect ELP is linguistic 
psychology capable of making truly fascinating discoveries relating to the beliefs or 
intuitions (folk psychology).10
 
  
 OLP, by contrast, is not interested in what the majority of people happen to think at 
any given time and place but, rather, in objective facts about linguistic norms. As noted 
by Turing above, gathering statistics about what people believe is true might tells us 
precious little about whether these belief are actually true. Indeed, it may even be 
possible for the majority of people to hold mistaken views about what Grice called 
conventional meaning (viz. the conventional meaning of words within a given 
language). 
 
 To elaborate, linguistic polls can only tell us what people think about (speaker or 
expression) meaning. Accordingly, ELP can offer explanatory accounts of why people 
tend to think certain things  in certain contexts, but not others. Such information might 
not even tell us anything about speaker meaning (viz. what they intend to say and get 
others to believe etc.) unless it were true that people do not use words in ways which 
contradict their own assertions about what the words mean; empirical studies could 
yield informative answers here. A competent speaker will, of course, mean to say what 
they say conventionally, even if they cannot fully spell out why,11
 
 but ELP is in the 
wrong business if it wishes to ascertain the expression meaning of any given term or 
expression, let alone how it came to arise. 
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This is not to say that the kind of evidence gathered by experimental philosophers of 
everyday tells us nothing about the norms of conventional (expression) meaning. After 
all, majority usage is typically a good indicator of correct usage.12
 
 But it would be 
wrong to conclude form this that ELP offers empirically verified – and therefore better 
- answers to the same questions that OLP is answering. First of all, even if the results of 
ELP accurately and reliably reflected ordinary usage, it would not follow that ELP was 
a methodological improvement on OLP. For we do not need to conduct experiments in 
order to report correct usage, no matter how difficult the case; it would be an awkward 
state of affairs indeed if we relied on questionnaires to find out whether or not a certain 
kind of action (whose psychological and behavioural aspects had been made explicit) 
was intentional. 
This is not to say that we know such things by intuition, anymore than we know the 
rules of chess by intuition. We learn from parents, teachers, rule-books, dictionaries, 
literature etc. as well as by observing general linguistic behaviour, appealing to 
precedents to resolve cases of conflict. Neither OLP nor ELP is in a better position than 
the other in this respect, for linguistic mastery does not require any philosophical 
methodology at all.13
 
 When OLP talks of what we would say, it refers not to the latest 
up-to-the-minute statistics about what happens to be the case but to well-established, 
legitimate use, distinguishing further between paradigm and peripheral cases. Antti 
Kauppinen puts it well when he points out that phrases such as ‘what we would 
ordinarily say’ are elliptical for how ‘(1) competent users of the concepts in question 
would respond if (2) they considered the case in sufficiently ideal conditions and (3) 
their answer was influenced only by semantic considerations’ (2007:3).  
   Appiah has made similar-sounding point: 
 
For Austin, “What is to be said?” was not an invitation to collect 
ethnographic data about how a given population of persons might make 
sense of these statements. The answer was supposed to be obvious. What 
a person knows in knowing English, say, is what everyone competent 
speaker should say in a certain situation; and so, being competent 
myself, I know what everyone else speaker would say if they were 
competent. That is why it wouldn’t matter if we found individuals who 
didn’t say it: it would just show that they weren’t competent. In section 
21 of the Philosophical Investigations...Wittgenstein wrote: “We do in 
fact call ‘Isn’t the weather glorious today?’ a question, although it is 
used as a statement.”Until recently, philosophers in my tradition would 
have thought it impertinent to ask who the “we” is here, and pointless to 
go out and inquire of people in the street whether someone who said 
these words was really asking a question. (Appiah  2009a:19-20; cf. 
1007 & 2008b: VI) 
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But only to add: 
 
Philosophers have always been wonderfully confident in their ability to 
say what “it would be natural to say.” This confidence, experiments 
show, can sometimes lead us astray...the right answer, if there is one, 
isn’t necessarily to be determined by a head count... X-phi helps keep us 
honest and enforces a useful modesty about how much weight to give 
one’s personal hunches, even when they’re shared by the guy in the next 
office...this work is in a continuation of the project of conceptual 
analysis. If conceptual analysis is the analysis of “our” concepts, then 
shouldn’t one see how “we”—or representative samples of us—actually 
mobilize concepts in our talk? So one strain of this work seeks to elicit 
and tabulate intuitions people have about various scenarios (Appiah 
2008b:VI) 
 
This puts the conceptual cart before the horse.  Claims about ‘what we ordinarily say’ 
are not based on intuition but on well-established facts about the meaning of 
expressions (analogous to facts concerning the rules of Monopoly or chess), which no 
competent language-speaker could deny.14 This is not to say that philosophers may err 
in such matters e.g. by ignoring an established use at the expense of others. Indeed, one 
of the most central tenets that OLP inherited from the later Wittgenstein was that the 
disposition to make such mistakes is strengthened when one is in the grip of a 
philosophical picture.15 Such mistakes may be discovered looking again at the various 
established uses of any given word or expression, but this is not to rely on intuition but 
on fact (and factive explanation). Austin, who frequently returned to the literary 
samples listed in the Oxford English Dictionary would have welcomed ELP as an ally 
with new tools, rather than as a competitor.16
 
  
Norm and Intuition 
Whilst OLP is a form of ‘armchair philosophy’ it does not determine what counts as 
legitimate usage through hunches, intuition, or common sense. Rather, it proceeds by 
way of recalling various different senses, usually through illustrative examples. This is 
neither empirical discovery nor arbitrary decision (Hare 1960:208), for the norms of 
language are part and parcel of the (contingent) practices that embody them. An 
expression may thus acquire a new meaning through systematic misuse or a (non-
arbitrary) decision to adopt or extend some rule of usage, but this does not make it 
illegitimate. 
 
By contrast, Kaupinnen (2007) claims that research into people’s linguistic intuitions 
cannot reveal any conceptual truths, for what we can legitimately say is not necessarily 
the same as what we ordinarily think we can say (cf. 2007). Joshua Knobe has 
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responded to such charges by arguing that X-Phi is simply not interested in such 
semantic questions: 
 
Kauppinen’s argument raises many fascinating questions both in 
philosophy and in cognitive science, but I worry that the principal claim 
is simply a red herring in the present context. It doesn’t even matter 
whether experimental philosophy can help us to analyze the semantics of 
our concepts because that is not the aim that most experimental 
philosophers were trying to achieve in the first place. Most experimental 
research now being conducted is actually in the service of a very 
different philosophical project... As far as I can see, the idea that 
questions about human nature fall outside the scope of philosophy was 
just the expression of a bizarre sort of academic fashion. The thing to do 
now is just to put aside our methodological scruples and go after the 
traditional problems with everything we’ve got. The question now is 
why all of these researchers attach so much significance to the issue in 
the first place. My bet would be that very few of them began pursuing 
the issue because they were curious about the extension of the English 
word ‘intentional.’ (I’m not even sure why that is supposed to be an 
important philosophical question.) ... I have suggested that we abandon 
the assumption that the study of people’s intuitions about cases can only 
have philosophical significance insofar as it helps us to answer semantic 
questions (Knobe 2007: 120). 
 
Knobe adds:  
 
It is true that there was a period in the twentieth century when many 
philosophers did hold such a view about the scope of philosophical 
inquiry, but perhaps we should regard that whole episode as just a 
peculiar aberration in the otherwise consistent history of our discipline. 
After putting it behind us, we can return in full force to what have 
traditionally been seen as the central questions of philosophy (Knobe 
2007: 121). 
 
It is not obvious that the philosophers that Knobe has in mind have approved of ELP’s 
use of statistical surveys, David Hume, for instance, frequently states that both 
philosophers and the ‘vulgar’ misuse various terms and that if they grasped the proper 
significance of any idea (to be determined by searching for the relevant impressions) 
numerous disputes central to philosophy would disappear.17 Contrary to philosophers 
associated with OLP, Hume’s talk of ‘common usage’ is not elliptical for legitimate 
use. OLP could thus agree with his view that ‘words, as commonly used, have very 
loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very uncertain and confused.’18 
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Pace Appiah it is ELP (rather than Hume or ELP) that seems to be attaching 
considerable value to our intuitions. 
 
   Moreover, it is simply false that ELP makes no attempt to answer semantic questions. 
Consider the following passage from Knobe’s 2003 paper ‘Intentional Action and Side-
Effects in Ordinary Language’, in which he follows Harman (1976) in claiming that ‘a 
person’s intuitions as to whether or not a given side-effect was produced ‘intentionally” 
can be influenced by that person’s ethical attitude toward the specific side-effect in 
question:’ 
 
There seems to be an asymmetry whereby people are considerably more 
willing to blame the agent for bad side-effects than to praise the agent 
for good side-effects. And this asymmetry in people’s assignment of 
praise and blame may be at the root of the corresponding asymmetry in 
people’s application of the concept intentional: namely, that they seem 
considerably more willing to say that a side-effect was brought about 
intentionally when they regard that side-effect as bad than when they 
regard it as good ...This question goes to the heart of a major 
controversy regarding the proper analysis of the concept of intentional 
action...Now, when we encounter a controversy like this one, it can 
sometimes be helpful to ask ourselves what people would ordinarily say 
about the situation under discussion. Would people ordinarily say that 
the side-effects of a behaviour were brought about intentionally? 
Clearly, ordinary language does not here constitute a court of final 
appeal. (Even if it turns out that people ordinarily call side-effects 
‘intentional’, we might conclude that they are truly unintentional.) Still, 
it does seem plausible that the examination of ordinary language might 
provide us with some useful guidance about difficult cases like this one 
(Knobe 2003: 191) 
 
There’s the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back.19
 
 Knobe notes that 
in 2001 Alfred Mele claimed that it is always wrong ‘to say that a side-effect was 
brought about intentionally’ but that ‘he now retracts this view in response to an earlier 
version of the present paper’. Whatever the linguistic truth of the matter, this is a clear 
case of a philosopher (Mele) consciously changing their minds about ‘the extension of 
the English word “intentional”’ as the result of a Gallup poll.  
Knobe denies that ‘ordinary language’ constitutes a ‘final court of appeal’ yet is happy 
to be conceptually informed by statistical surveys. But to ask what the extension of the 
English word ‘intentional’ is just is to ask what its extension is within established 
discourse.  The philosophical significance of ELP largely rests on the employment of 
perceptive questions that serve as neat linguistic reminders irrespective of how the 
‘ordinary folk’ responded to them. To this extent it functions much like any other 
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thought experiment, such as the sorts of ‘oblique intention’ scenarios discussed by 
Glanville Williams and H.L.A. Hart: 
 
Suppose one man is walking with another along the edge of a cliff and 
sees a diamond ring on the path before him. Knowing that his 
companion also wishes to get the ring, he pushes him over the cliff, 
believing that this will in all probability lead to his death (Hart 1968: 
126; cf. G. Williams 1987). 
 
The first man does not (directly) intend to kill the second yet it would be absurd to 
deny that this is a case of attempted murder. This is not a matter of intuition or 
common-sense but of conceptual competence (which cannot be acquired through straw 
polls). Not all cases will be so clear-cut, of course. ELP confirms that some of our 
notions (such as that of doing something intentionally) are vague, ambiguous, or 
divided. In this, however, it resembles the work oflegal theorists such as G. Williams 
and Hart, replete as it was with references to actual court cases. 
 
   In conclusion, proponents of ELP have a strong tendency to lumber claims about 
ordinary usage together with claims about intuitions or common-sense . To give a final 
example, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Eddy Nahmias write: 
 
Any areas of philosophy that rely on (i) intuition-pumps and thought 
experiments, (ii) appeals to commonsense and pre-philosophical 
intuition or (iii) conceptual analysis based in part on ordinary usage or 
‘platitudes’ are ripe for investigation by experimental philosophers who 
are, above all, interested in examining these things in a controlled and 
systematic way. This interest is driven by two assumptions: First, there 
is a shared distrust of philosophers’ (common) claims of the general 
form ‘X is intuitive,’ ‘Ordinarily, we believe X,’ ‘The ordinary use of 
“X” is Y,’ ‘It is natural for people to believe X,’ and the like. These are 
claims that philosophers usually make based upon armchair reflection on 
their own intuitions and (perhaps selective) consideration of their 
conversations with friends, family, and especially students. But these 
methods of determining what is widely accepted seem highly susceptible 
to well-known biases such as confirmation bias, disconfirmation bias, 
and false consensus bias—biases that may be even more pronounced in 
philosophers than laypersons given the philosophers’ extensive 
theoretical training and their use of intuition claims to confirm their own 
theoretical views. (Naddelhoffer & Nahmias 2007: 125; cf. Appiah 
2008a). 
 
I have tried to show that while various kinds of bias cause one to make mistaken claims 
about ordinary usage, but opinion polls have no priviledged position from which they 
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might better settle normative questions about proper linguistic usage.20
 
 It is natural for 
members of a movement in relative infancy to overstate their case. This proved to be 
disastrous for OLP, hopefully it will not be so for ELP. 
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1957: 218-9). 
 
12 Many thanks to the referees for putting this point across so persuasively. 
 
13 Certainly sentences may acquire new meanings if sufficient people consistently use (or misuse) them 
in a new way for an extended period of time, and eventually lose their old meaning if people altogether 
cease to use them as they once were used. But the majority of speakers can misuse a term or expression 
(e.g. ‘bespoke’ or ‘beg the question’) for a considerable period of time before it becomes true that the 
conventional meaning of the expression has changed. Such changes don’t miraculously occur as soon as 
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use (i.e. function), and that to posses full knowledge of the one is to possess full knowledge of the other, 
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philosophy movement, are these: give up reliance on intuition to the extent to which this is possible 
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the dilemma which ELP presents us with is a false one. 
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